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Abstract:  
 
Poaching has been, and continues to be, of significant concern to the conservation of 
biodiversity. While media descriptions of poaching often include vivid details about the animal 
victims and the heroics of those fighting to conserve biodiversity, ambiguity still surrounds ‘the 
poacher’. Clarifying the identity of a poacher is necessary to expose a societal tendency to 
enforce stereotypes on others that perpetuate violence and inequality. Without knowing the 
identity of a poacher, it becomes easy to impose unsubstantiated beliefs upon them that 
legitimize unjust and violent policies like shoot-to-kill and life-time jail sentences. This research 
seeks to understand how the media has constructed the identity and context of the poacher to 
answer critical questions of how and why violent protected area policies have become perceived 
as necessary conservation strategies. Through a media content analysis of newspaper reports and 
field interviews with conservation actors, this paper explores the human rights implications 
around how the media and society place poachers within a ‘space of exception’ that legitimizes 
the state and private sector’s claims biopower and strengthens a post-democratic conservation 
approach.  
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On July 3rd, 2018, human remains were discovered near a pride of lions in South Africa’s Sibuya 
Game Reserve. In the thick bush, investigators found three pairs of boots and three pairs of gloves, 
a high-powered rifle, silencers, wire cutters, and an axei.  
 
With that discovery, the investigation into their deaths halted. According to officials, the remains 
belonged to rhino poachers who were attacked and eaten by lions while trespassing in the reserve. 
Social media engagement on news articles about the event alleged that the outcome – being eaten 
by lions – was the appropriate level of punishment for these men. Many posts asserted that more 
extreme and violent punishments would have been more suitable to “even the score” between 
poachers and natureii. These news reports also focused their discussions on the plight of elephants 
and rhinos in the recent “ivory poaching crisis”iii. But, there was an absence of any information – 
or interest into – who these individuals were, where they came from, or what circumstances led 
them to enter Sibuya Game Reserve on that day.
Introduction 
The case described above is emblematic of society’s typical view of ivory poaching that 
is focused on protecting biodiversity at all costs, even at the expense of human lives. As the 
anecdote also reveals, when violence befalls those seen as violating or endangering wildlife, this 
is largely perceived by the public as deserved and even the preferred outcome in such a situation. 
Yet, despite this contention that violence – in this case being eaten by lions – against poachers is 
deserved, society frequently does not know who actually experienced this violence. For example, 
when examining news articles and official social media posts by conservation organizations on 
the incident described above, no information is ever given about the men killed. It begs a 
question of how society can condone and, in many cases, call for violence against a group of 
people despite not knowing who they are, where they come from, or why the engage in a 
particular behavior.  
This omission of humanizing information about poachers is unsurprising when 
considering the dominant discourse on ivory poaching that focuses disproportionately on 
wildlife. In news reports, the public is often given vivid descriptions of the animal victims 
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targeted and the heroics of conservation practitioners and rangers who protect threatened species 
like elephant and rhino (Barua 2010; Mbaria and Ogada 2016). But, information about the 
poacher is largely absent from these discussions. Instead, as this research will empirically 
demonstrate, when poachers are considered, descriptions tends to be vague and focused on 
stereotypical concepts of greed and cruelty.  
Without knowing the true identities of poachers, it becomes easy to impose these 
stereotypical characteristics upon them that can legitimize unjust and violent policies. Research 
has extensively demonstrated the ease with which society can ascribe exaggerated and false 
characteristics to other groups that lead to violence and inequality (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; 
Harrison and Esqueda 1999; Scharrer 2002; Sides and Gross 2013; Saleem and Anderson 2013; 
Obaidi et al 2019). Thus, clarifying the identity of a poacher is necessary to expose this societal 
tendency within conservation to illuminate how violent and militaristic policies have become 
accepted approaches in conservation.  
While a number of scholars have examined the mechanisms through which conservation 
has become increasingly militarized (Peluso 1993; Peluso and Watts 2000; Duffy 2000; 
Neumann 2001; Davalos 2001; Lunstrum 2015; Masse 2017; Masse et al 2018; Hitchcock 2019; 
Buckley 2019), there still remains inattention to how the global public perceives this violence 
and those targeted by it and perpetuates its usage as a legitimate conservation strategy. As the 
media is a lens through which to understand the social fabric of society, how it depicts violence 
in conservation reflects and influences prevailing societal beliefs (Ferguson 2014; Slater 2007; 
Sotirovic 2003). Media depictions are also significant because they are understood and 
internalized by a range of actors, thus wielding immense power in shaping conservation 
discourses (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006).  
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Purpose 
Given this brief background, the purpose of this research is to understand how the media 
and conservationists construct the identity and context of the poacher to answer critical questions 
of how and why violent protected area policies have become accepted practices in contemporary 
conservation. Specifically, I offer an analysis of the media and conservation actors’ roles in 
defining an identity for poachers that situates them within a space of exception where they are 
not afforded the same rights or protection as other members of society. It is through this 
discursive positioning that poachers become perceived as deserving targets of violence.  
We argue that it is in the state’s interests to perpetuate this narrative of "the poacher" to 
justify its use of violence and emphasize its power over its citizens in what Foucault’s biopower 
noted as "making live" and "letting die” (Houen 2008; Biddick and Joy 2016). As the public 
continues to support the state’s power to make decisions about the lives and deaths of others 
within the framework of conservation, both the state and private conservancies, or privately-
owned lands that engage in conservation activities (Endicott 1993; Carter et al. 2008) and 
exemplify the increasingly neoliberal conservation approach, are able to maintain a status quo of 
militarization and violence over the control of natural resources.  
This research pays particular attention to how violence is articulated by managers and 
wildlife officials at private conservancies to elucidate how the shift in the type of conservation, 
from state to private, has shaped the expression and acceptance of violence. Conservation has 
historically been the domain of the state but, with the intrusion of neoliberal ideologies, it has 
increasingly shifted to the private sector. As both who enacts the violence and how that violence 
is differently perceived and interpreted by the public matters, it is necessary to examine how both 
the state and private actors understand and engage with violent protected area policies. I further 
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examine how the state and private conservancies operate symbiotically and how the relationship 
between the state and private conservancies extends beyond the unique domain of the state into 
the private sector.  
While conservation violence is a salient issue around the world, this research focuses 
specifically on East Africa, with much of the data coming from Kenya. Kenya is an important 
site in which to understand the nuances of violent protected area policies because it has 
numerous private conservancies and an extensive history of ivory poaching that has prompted 
state and private protected areas alike to implement or propose militarized policies (Norton-
Griffiths and Said 2010). Additionally, Kenya’s history of colonialism has significantly shaped 
the country’s approach to biodiversity conservation and conservation policy to have important 
implications for how violent enforcement policies are understood by local actors (Steinhart 1989, 
Petursson and Vedeld 2015; Grove 2017).  
 
Research Questions  
Given this brief background, I specifically pose four research questions to examine how 
violent and militarized protected area enforcement policies have become the cornerstones of the 
contemporary conservation approach. In particular, to understand how the public has come to 
accept violent protected areas enforcement policies, I ask the following research questions: 
1. How does the media construct the poacher? 
2. In what ways does this construction contribute to the escalation of violence in 
conservation policy and action? 
While the media is a useful medium through which to analyze public beliefs as it is 
consumed by large numbers of people and has been demonstrated as a powerful tool in shaping 
public perceptions and attitudes (Morley 2005; McCombs 2005; Baum and Potter 2008), an 
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analysis focused exclusively on media representations leaves out the voices and actions of 
conservation actors on the ground. It is necessary to include this dimension to better understand 
how violence in conservation is articulated in these spaces and rationalized by those physically 
enacting these policies. As such, I posed two additional research questions: 
3. How do different conservation actors (conservation policy officials, conservation 
NGOs, and wildlife rangers) understand poachers and poaching? 
4. How do these different understandings affect conservation violence? 
To answer these critical questions, this research is divided into two components – a 
media content analysis and an empirical fieldwork component. First, I examine the theoretical 
frames that provide the conceptual foundation for this work: green militarization, biopower and 
spaces of exceptions, post democracy, and media studies. These bodies of literature come 
together to unveil the complexity of conservation violence and expose the mechanisms through 
which violent and militarized protected area strategies have become accepted practices.  
Next, I discuss our chosen research site, Kenya, and examine how its unique context and 
history has shaped approaches to protected area enforcement and the involvement of the private 
sector. Then, through a media content analysis of forty years of news articles about ivory 
poaching, I demonstrate how the media positions poachers within an excepted space. Next, I 
assess how the on-the-ground reality of protected area enforcement reflect the media analysis 
and examine how different conservation actors perceive poachers and justify conservation 
violence.  
I then conclude by offering an explanation for how the state and private conservation 
actors rationalize the use of violence in conservation. Finally, I analyze how the distortion of the 
barrier between the state and the private sector in conservation has shaped the articulation of 
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violence and resulted in new forms of conservation governance that allow the private sector to 
lay claim to droit de glaive.  
 
Literature Review  
Green Militarization  
In the last several decades, scholars in political ecology have critically examined the 
nexus between violence and natural resources. In her seminal work, “Coercing Conservation”, 
Peluso (1993) theorized that states have a vested interest in controlling natural resources and 
appropriate the moral ideology of conservation as a justification for using violence to do so. 
Homer-Dixon (1994) proposed that scarcities of critical environmental resources contribute to 
the advent and worsening of violent conflicts. In particular, he invoked population growth as the 
primary cause. Peluso and Watts (2001) pushed back against his neo-Malthusian, arguing that 
environmental violence is site specific and rooted in local histories, social relations, and larger 
political economies. Le Billon (2001) further demonstrates the mechanisms through which states 
control economically valuable natural resources and suppress the dissenting claims of opposition 
groups, often through the use of violent force.   
While violence around natural resources and conservation is nothing new (Steinhart 
2006; Dowie 2011), the transition of the sites of violence to primarily include protected areas and 
the use of heavily militarized technologies and private security forces has come under greater 
scrutiny recently. Coined green militarization, this concept theorizes about the meshing of 
militarization and conservation by examining “the use of military and paramilitary (military-like) 
actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation goals” 
(Lunstrum 2014). This is rationalized by the pervasion of a ‘war for biodiversity’ rhetoric and the 
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accompanying discourses of national identity, narco-traffic, and terrorism that have converted 
conservation into an issue of national security (Ferradas 2004; Williams 2014).  
Research around green militarization has focused on its role in creating and perpetuating 
unequal and problematic power relations between local communities and state conservation 
officials (Buscher and Fletcher 2014; Buscher and Fletcher 2015; Duffy 2016; Bocarejo and 
Ojeda 2016). As Peluso (1993) argues, the legitimized use of violence against citizens by the 
state in the name of natural resource protection allows the state to leverage greater control over 
people, widening existing power imbalances and resulting in the marginalization of particular 
groups. The use of state-sanctioned violence in the name of biodiversity conservation “carries a 
risk that human rights will be compromised in the pursuit of anti-poaching initiatives” and 
creates the perception by society that certain human lives are valued below biodiversity (Duffy 
2014, 324).  
Yet, green militarization research has primarily focused on the state as the enactor of 
violence in conservation. Research on the role of private actors have primarily examined how 
neoliberal policies of conservation that commodify nature have increased the private sector’s 
control of land and biodiversity, known as the neoliberailization of conservation (Roberston 
2004). Through this, there has been an expansion of key conservation actors to include societal 
elites, businesses, and entrepreneurs (Brockington and Duffy 2010; Buscher and Fletcher 2015; 
Holmes and Cavanagh 2016). While conservation is frequently positioned as a “bulwark against 
the spread of neoliberalism”, as it defends biodiversity against the destructive force of free-
market capitalism, private conservancies exemplify neoliberalism’s intrusion into this space 
(Igoe and Brockington 2007, 433; Heynen and McCarthy 2007).  
Neoliberalization is defined as a series of processes that seek to increase the role of the 
private sector in the economy and society. The first process, deregulation, scales back the 
 8 
involvement of states and their regulatory practices as they are portrayed as corrupt, inefficient, 
and restrictive of the market. Privatization, the second process of neoliberalization, is seen by 
advocates of neoliberalism as the solution to these shortcomings. Here, the role of the state shifts 
to the private sector, where private entities are tasked with implementing and overseeing 
government programs and services (Metzger, 2003). 
The shift towards neoliberal conservation has largely occurred in the last several decades. 
Despite state-sponsored protected areas serving, until recently, as the mainstay of conservation 
efforts, conservationists have long condemned the inefficiency and corrupt nature of the state as 
hindering their objectives and limiting the range of activities performed (Smith et al. 2003). 
While new state protected areas do continue to emerge, privatization has been increasingly 
heralded as the key to conservation success, demonstrated through the proliferation of private 
game reserves and conservation-oriented business ventures by transnational conservation NGOs 
(Langholz 2003; Igoe 2007; Brockington et al. 2012). These private conservancies, operated as 
for-profit enterprises by wealthy elites and foreign donors, promise to improve upon the state’s 
approach by offering more – more resources, more participation, and more unique wildlife 
viewing opportunities for visitors (Ojeda 2012).  
Historically, the state has welcomed the involvement of private actors in conservation – 
providing tax incentives, sub-dividing collectively held land to make available for private 
investors and conservation NGOs to purchase, and entering into joint public-private partnerships 
with private conservation enterprises (Berlanga and Faust 2007; Igoe and Brockington 2007). 
Through these mechanisms, neoliberal conservation, in the form of private conservancies, has 
become the gold-standard of conservation in many regions of the world.   
Masse and Lunstrum (2016) have further examined neoliberal conservation through an 
analysis of ‘accumulation by securitization’, the dynamic in which “capital accumulation is 
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enabled by practices and related logics of security in ways that often provoke dispossession, 
which enables further accumulation” (223) and how it is supported by the state and networks of 
private actors (Masse and Lunstrum 2016). However, existing analyses have not included an 
examination of how the specific forms and tactics of environmental violence has shifted with the 
inclusion of private actors nor what the implications of this shift has been.  
Despite the growing body of literature on the militarization of conservation, research on 
the media’s role in this discourse has been limited. Neumann (2004) examined the intersections 
between the media and conservation violence. He reasoned that the manner in which “things are 
discursively constructed…determines moral worthiness and standing” within society (465). He 
further applies these ideas to conservation by arguing that, in criminalizing certain activities and 
assigning particular characteristics to poachers, conservation has created a moral geography that 
defines certain actions (hunting) and certain people (poachers) as morally wrong. In contrast, 
violent retribution against poachers by the state is perceived as morally just and necessary. It is 
through conservation’s construction of the identities of poachers and wildlife, where wild 
animals are anthropomorphized while poachers are vilified, that society is effectively reordered.  
The construction of conservation’s “enemies” in this manner normalizes violence against people 
in African protected areas (Ybarra 2012).  
Lunstrum (2017) argues that the internalization of the “war for biodiversity” rhetoric has 
created a space where conventional laws governing violence has been suspended. Given the 
proliferation of social media as a bellwether for societal discourse, she demonstrates this through 
an analysis of social media comments that reflect poachers’ existence in an excepted space where 
they “have already lost that which would render him or her human in any sense beyond mere 
biological existence” (Lunstrum 2017, 131). Thus, when poachers are killed, society does not 
perceive this as a homicide but rather as necessary for conservation practices.  
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Despite these analyses, understanding of the media’s role in conservation violence is 
severely limited. Neumann’s results are based on an analysis of a single article and thus the 
generalizability of his findings is questionable. Lunstrum’s paper, while exploring the 
connections between poachers, excepted spaces, and social media engagement, fails to consider 
how the media itself can position poachers within spaces of exception. As there has not yet been 
a systematic investigation into how the media constructs the identity and context of poachers, 
this research elucidates important elements in how violence has become accepted as a legitimate 
conservation strategy. 
The academic discourse on green militarization provides a necessary contextual 
foundation for this work by exploring the mechanisms through which conservation has become 
increasingly violent and militarized. Additionally, this literature provides a useful understanding 
of how the emergence of neoliberal conservation has increased the role of private actors, 
providing a necessary base for examining the differences in how conservation actors understand 
poachers, poaching, and violent protected area policies.  While this literature is essential for 
understanding the methods of conservation violence and the effects of this violence on different 
groups, it is limited in its ability to answer how and why violence has become commonplace in 
the state and private actor’s conservation approach. To answer these questions, I borrow from 
Foucault’s theory of biopower and Agamben’s spaces of exception to provide the theoretical 
scaffolding for this research advance our understanding of violence in African protected areas.  
 
Biopower and Spaces of Exception   
Foucault (1978)’s notions of biopower refer to a unique form of power that legitimates 
itself based on its claim to nurture and protect the lives it is charged to defend. Various scholars 
have argued that this construction of power defines itself in relation to a biological field by 
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dividing those who must live from those who must die, or as Foucault specified, “making live” 
and “letting die” (Mbembe and Meintjes 2003; Ojakangas 2005; Patton 2007; Buscher 2018).  
While Foucault’s definition of biopower was applied specifically to human populations, 
scholars have expounded upon his theory to describe how actions protecting nonhuman lives are 
defended using similar biopolitical terms (Luke 1999; Cavanagh 2014; Fletcher 2018). Biopower 
can specifically be understood as it relates to conservation in the enforcement of protected areas, 
which demonstrate the state’s defense of the nonhuman lives that it considers within its domain 
(Youatt 2008; Biermann and Mansfield 2014). Fletcher (2018) contends, “in aggressively 
defending protected areas, states can claim that they are simply extending their general 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force” into the realm of conservation (235).   
Biopower and its usage by the state and conservation is closely related to Agamben’s 
notion of spaces of exception. Agamben (1997) theorized that a space of exception emerges 
when there is a temporary suspension of the rule of law by state authorities within a space by on 
the basis of the state’s perception of a danger. Further, when a space of exception acquires an 
enduring spatial arrangement, it remains permanently outside the normal state of law in a society. 
When this occurs around an individual, who is seen as spoiling the harmony of a nation or area, 
homo sacer, or a bare life, emerges. Here, individuals are divested of political status, protection 
by the state and its laws, and are relegated to the fringes of society (Agamben 1995; Martin 
2015). It is thus through the creation of excepted spaces and fictionalized enemies that the state 
“civilizes” the art of killing by placing rational objectives upon the act (Schmitt 2005).  
Lunstrum (2017)  applies spaces of exception to conservation by arguing that the state 
internalization of the ‘war on biodiversity’ rhetoric as being akin to a life or death struggle has 
created a space where conventional laws that govern violence are suspended. She builds upon 
this argument by demonstrating that when a poacher is killed within a protected area, it is not 
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considered homicide as poachers have, in the eyes of the state, “already lost that which would 
render him or her human in any sense beyond mere biological existence” (Lunstrum 2017b, 102). 
Instead, their deaths are seen as necessary acts for the achievement of conservation goals. Thus, 
poachers exist in an excepted space where they are considered to be undeserving of the rights 
and protection accorded to other citizens.  
Additionally, the park itself is an excepted space where the laws of nature rather than the 
laws of society dominate (Duffy 2016). Martin (2015) explains this by arguing that a national 
park can be conceived as “a piece of land that is placed outside the normal juridical order”, 
where otherwise unacceptable violence is both condoned and encouraged (46). Therefore, by 
positioning poachers within both a proverbial and literal space of exception, violent policies can 
be perceived as necessary.  
As threatened species like elephant and rhino are absorbed into the state’s national 
“community” and poachers become seen as threats to their lives and the nation itself, the use of 
violence in conservation becomes legitimated on the basis of biopower. The poachers, existing in 
a space of exception, are constructed as “the enemy” of the state and are thus defined as 
deserving to die. In other words, it is through the creation of a political enemy (the poacher), the 
organization of war against these perceived adversaries (shoot-to-kill and other militarized anti-
poaching policies), and the exposure of its own citizenry to violence (via the media) that the 
modern state consolidates its right to kill. This process of making decisions about which of its 
citizens may live and which must die, or as Foucault defined it, “making live and letting die”, 
further exemplifies the power that the modern state has over its people.     
While the concept of biopower has been applied to understand militarized protected area 
enforcement as a product of the state’s biopolitical agenda, little analysis has been extended to 
consider how the positioning of poachers within excepted spaces furthers the “making live and 
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letting die” rhetoric of the state by reconciling the paradoxical nature of using violence to 
enforce biopower. Additionally, current approaches for understanding the intersection between 
biopower and conservation have primarily centered on the state’s use of biopower, with little 
explicit consideration given to how biopower is deployed by the private sector through the 
militarization of private conservancies. As the who enacts violence matter for how violence is 
understood, it is necessary to critically examine how the state and private actors each make 
distinctive, but often overlapping, claims to biopower. This research aims to answer these critical 
questions to understand how the constructed narrative of the poacher allows for the maintaining 
of a status quo of militarization within natural resource control by both the state and private 
interests.  
 
Post-Democracy 
 Foucault’s biopower and Agamben’s spaces of exception combine with theories of green 
militarization to explain how the state and the public justify the use of violence in protected area 
management. While green militarization theories do consider how the private sector expresses 
violence in conservation, these theories are incomplete for understanding how the private 
sector’s use of violence is accepted by the public and the state in particular. In the following 
section, I utilize Crouch’s theory of post-democracy to examine how private elite interests have 
expanded into conservation to blur the lines between state and private, thereby providing an 
opportunity for private actors to make claims to biopower. I argue that, as the lines between the 
state and the private become blurred, important distinctions between the enactors of violence 
become less perceptible to the public, normalizing the use of violence by the private sector.  
Crouch’s theory of post-democracy (2004) is a useful conceptual framework to examine 
how conservation has become increasingly dominated by elite private actors who use this 
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position of power to make decisions about the lives and deaths of other citizens. Post-democracy 
refers to a form of governance “which formally retains all democratic institutions and rituals but 
relocates political power and decision making to arenas where elite interests rule largely 
insulated from democratic participation and accountability” (Crouch 2000, 143). Post-democracy 
can thus be characterized by the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of 
society’s elites. Swyngedouw (2011) applies post-democracy to Agamben’s spaces of exception 
by arguing that the existence of a permanent emergency can stimulate a prolonged space of 
exception that creates a political climate where national security is privileged over individual 
liberties. In such a case, and particularly when the state is unable or unwilling to manage this 
emergency, elite actors are able to exert considerable control under the guise of protecting 
national interests.  
While several scholars (Bond et al. 2015; Brockington 2015; Fletcher 2014) have 
interrogated how conservation can be interpreted through post-politics and post-democratic 
lenses, their analyses have primarily focused on environmental movements and conservation 
NGOs. There has been no attention to the ways in which the poaching crisis and the positioning 
of poachers in an excepted space have contributed to the emergence of a post-democratic 
conservation landscape. Additionally, I argue that, when this power over decision-making by 
elite actor’s transitions into the life-and-death arena where the private sector is given authority to 
enact violence against others, the emergence of a post-democratic state then allows private actors 
to make claims to biopower.  
  In addition to the expansion of the private sector’s power in conservation, in recent 
decades, the boundary between the state and the private sector has become increasingly porous. 
This “blurring” of the state and the private has occurred in a variety of ways. First, private 
conservancies operations mirror those of the state. For example, private conservancies’ 
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employment of private military forces and ranger teams and their use of surveillance 
technologies to monitor and police their boundaries are the same techniques used in state 
protected areas (Duffy 2006; Wels 2015; Sambu 2017).  
Second, private conservancies often border state protected areas to maintain migratory 
corridors. As conservationists frequently are unable the use of fences due to migrating wildlife 
and so must instead employ alternative boundary enforcement techniques, the borders between 
state and private protected areas are increasingly indistinct (Martino 2001).  
Third, private conservancies cannot create their own laws and regulations but must apply 
those of the state within their bounds. Private conservancies thus act as enforcers of the state’s 
rules rather than as separate lawmakers. While the rules of engagement are often indistinct in 
practice, as many working in security at private conservancies are ex-military (Mkutu et al. 
2017) and it is difficult to police the exact interpretation and execution of state policies, private 
conservancies can still be seen as pseudo-agents of the state through their operations. 
Finally, the state and private conservancies rely on each other to operate in the manner they 
do, creating a symbiotic relationship between the two. Private conservancies can only operate in 
their current manner with the government’s blessing. The use of private military forces and 
surveillance technologies by non-government actors without the state’s explicit approval is 
typically perceived as a threat against the state and its sovereignty (Richards 2012). Thus, private 
conservancies can only use the militarized approaches they have come to rely on with the 
explicit approval of the government.  
Conversely, the state actively benefits from the existence of private conservancies. Private 
conservancies can perform conservation activities that go beyond the state’s capacity and limited 
resources, exemplified by initiatives like rhino breeding programs and other financial and human 
capital-intensive conservation programs. And, private conservancies are able to market unique 
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services that the state cannot – off road game drives, private tours of wildlife rehabilitation 
centers, or one-of-a-kind dining experiences. In addition to the ability to tax private 
conservancies, the exclusive services provided by private conservancies also attract more 
visitors, thereby increasing tourism revenue for the state.  
Through these mechanisms and the rise of explicit public-private partnerships in 
conservation, the line between public and private has become distorted. In my analysis, I 
examine the potential implications of this blurring and speculate on how private actors use this to 
make seemingly legitimate claims to biopower. Additionally, by exploring how the private sector 
has adopted, and in some ways extended, the state’s role in post-democratic conservation, I 
expose the emergence of new forms of conservation governance. Figure 1 reflects the dual nature 
of the private sector in reinforcing the existing conservation paradigm and for allowing new 
forms of governance to emerge. As new governance systems affect the forms and tactics of 
violence used, interrogating this dimension allows us to better consider the shifting nature of 
violence in protected area management.  
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Figure 1. Diagram of the interaction between the State and the private in conservation.  
 
Post-democracy serves as a useful framework for understanding the increased role of the 
private sector and societal elites in conservation and the emergence of new forms of conservation 
governance. When post-democracy is used alongside Foucault’s biopower, Agamben’s spaces of 
exception, and green militarization, we can uncover critical nuances in how conservation 
violence is articulated and justified by different actors to become a central tenant in the modern 
conservation approach.  
In my analysis of conservation violence, I focus particularly on the media’s role in its 
legitimization, arguing that media depictions of poachers construct an identity and context for 
them that permits the use of violence. Before making this claim, it is first necessary to establish 
the power of the media in shaping public perceptions. In the next section, I explore the existing 
research on the intersection between the media, identity, and violence. 
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Media, Identity Construction, and Violence 
The media has extensively been implicated in shaping the development of identities and 
influencing the internalization of particular societal tropes within ethnic and national categories 
(Faist et al. 2010; Georgiou 2006; Katz 1998). Jackson (2006) establishes the critical role that the 
media plays in shaping the values, intentions, and characteristics assigned to different groups, 
particularly those of different races or ethnicities, through his analysis of media representations 
of race in America. He argues that the American public’s perceptions of different races and their 
alleged beliefs and characteristics is strongly correlated to media depictions of these different 
groups.  
“Framing” also plays a critical role in influencing perceptions of other groups as 
journalists, guided by their own biases, select certain events and strategically place them within a 
field of meaning to tell a particular version of a story (Entman 2010; Tankard 2001).  This 
concept is particularly salient as journalistic bias acts as a powerful tool in influencing an 
audience’s perceptions of a group or event (Entman 2007).  
Moreover, the media’s power in assigning particular characteristics and influencing 
beliefs is particularly persuasive when violent imagery is used (Johnson et al., 2010; Fishman 
and Marvin 2003; Barker and Petley 2003). For example, when images of the Black Lives Matter 
protest movement included depictions of seemingly violent behavior from the protestors, it 
affected public opinion of the legitimacy of the movement (Won et al. 2017). In addition to 
shaping people’s beliefs, media depictions of certain groups can incite violence against them. 
Research on the Rwandan genocide revealed the power of the radio and main stream media in 
provoking violence against groups by demonizing them as having inherently evil qualities 
(Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Kellow and Steeves 1998; Straus 2007; Mcnulty 1999). Additionally, 
as Thompson (2007) discusses, the media stalled international intervention in Rwanda by falsely 
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constructing the genocide as an ethnic conflict, further demonstrating the media’s power in 
determining state and international actions.  
Finally, the media also normalizes violence (Malamuth and Briere 1986; Wood and 
Wong 1991; Fischer et al. 2010). Research has revealed that everyday depictions of violence in 
the media normalizes its existence and use in society (Carter 2007). He further argues that 
everyday use of violent imagery is “implicated in structuring the hegemony of powerful groups”, 
widening the imbalances between victims and perpetrators (87). Despite the breadth of research 
on the intersection between the media and violence, there has been little attention to how these 
ideas develop and manifest within conservation. Through my analysis of media depictions of 
poachers, I extend the current scholarship on media and violence into this unexplored space.   
This research explores how the media and conservation actors have constructed the 
identity and context of the poacher to understand how and why violent protected area policies 
have become accepted. By weaving together these bodies of literature (green militarization, 
biopower, spaces of exception, post-democracy, and media studies), we can better understand 
how state and private entities are enacting and justifying broader forms of violence in African 
protected areas.  In particular, I offer an analysis of how the media and central conservation 
actors position poachers within excepted spaces to increase the state and private actors’ power in 
“making live and letting die”. In the following section, I discuss our chosen research site, Kenya, 
and its history of protected area development and management.  
 
Study Site  
 While poaching is a global issue and militarized approaches to its management have been 
implemented in virtually every region of the world, I examine their use in the African context 
where violent protected area policies are increasingly common. Specifically, I focus on East 
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Africa as one of the primary sites of the contemporary ivory poaching crisis and due to the 
proliferation of news reports about ivory poaching from this region. Kenya was selected as the 
specific research site because of the country’s historic use of militarized conservation approaches 
and its considerable number of private conservancies. From a practical perspective, Kenya is a 
logical choice as both researchers had existing connections to its conservation community and 
had experience in country. Kenya has a long and complicated history of protected areas and 
conservation approaches and so, to fully understand how violence is expressed and justified 
there, it is necessary to first examine the historical context that shapes the country’s conservation 
approach.  
Historically, pre-colonial societies in Kenya lived and interacted freely with wildlife and 
developed various methods for managing wildlife and other natural resources based upon their 
cultural understanding and perceptions of territorial and social landscapes (Steinhart 1989; 
Akama 1998). Research on the history of wildlife conservation indicate that most pre-colonial 
Kenyan communities had governing regulations concerning the hunting and use of wildlife 
products; for example, it was considered taboo to hunt and kill certain species that had cultural or 
symbolic value to the community (Lusigi 1978; Ogot 1979).  
 With the establishment of the East African Protectorate in 1895 and the subsequent 
arrival of British colonial settlers, the perception arose that wildlife were competitors for limited 
resources and threats to settler’s expensive imported livestock and should thus be killed without 
impunity (Steinhart 2006). This belief, combined with the arrival of amateur and professional 
wildlife hunters and the country’s devastating rinderpest outbreak in the late nineteenth century, 
accelerated wildlife population declines and habitat destruction (Kabiri 2010).  
In response, Western conservationists, romanticizing the virtues of pristine nature, began 
campaigning for the preservation of natural areas, both at home and in the colonies (Akama 
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1996). Game Departments, composed primarily of British naturalists, aristocrats, and top 
administrative officials, were established to regulate sport hunters and limit the hunting and land-
use activities of the indigenous Kenyan people (Steinhart 1989, 250). These Game Departments 
gave rise to the establishment of protected areas throughout the colonial period, reaching a zenith 
in the mid 20th century. These protected areas were modeled on the assumption that protecting 
wildlife required separating them from the destructive forces of man (Neumann 2002). Known as 
“fortress conservation”, local communities were restricted from entering the area without 
authorization and previously acceptable practices of local people were transformed into illegal 
acts. Hunting and fishing become poaching and indigenous people become poachers, while 
comparable acts by wealthy elites remained sport (Jacoby 2014). The establishment of these 
protected areas also entailed the coercive and often violent removal of indigenous people 
(Agrawal and Redford 2009; Dowie 2011).  
Since independence in 1963, Kenya has seen an explosion in the number and size of 
protected areas; currently there are 23 terrestrial national parks, 28 terrestrial national reserves, 4 
marine national parks, 6 marine national reserves and 4 national sanctuaries. Collectively, these 
parks and reserves cover 8% of the national area (KWS 2019). Throughout much of the post-
colonial period, Kenya’s protected area management has closely resembled that of the colonial 
governments’ approach through the forcible removal of indigenous communities and the severe 
restriction of local land-use practices, particularly pastoralism. Further, with the spread of 
neoliberal conservation and the growing belief that conservation could be improved through 
privatization, greater percentages of Kenya’s land has been absorbed into conservation. Through 
the rise of private conservancies which are largely owned and operated by descendants of the 
colonial occupiers and the involvement of Western conservation scientists and conservation 
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NGOs in the country’s protected area management, conservation continues to alienate and 
marginalize local communities (Jones 2006).  
While there have some been attempts to decentralize conservation through the 
implementation of community-based conservation programs, wildlife conservation in Kenya has 
continued to emphasize law enforcement as the primary means to manage protected areas, 
particularly in the aftermath of the 1980s poaching “epidemic” (Buscher and Ramutsindela 2015; 
Annecke and Masubelele 2016). During this time, ivory poaching reached “crisis” levels; it was 
estimated that in 1980, the continent had over one million elephants but fewer than 600,000 
remained at the end of the decade (Christo 2012). The appointment of Dr. Richard Leakey in 
1989 to the head of the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), the country’s parastatal agency for 
conserving and managing wildlife, heralded a new era of anti-poaching and protected area 
enforcement (Gibson 1999). Here, the focus shifted towards a militarized approach via the 
initiation of law enforcement training for rangers, the adoption of more advanced anti-poaching 
technology, and the alleged implementation of a shoot-to-kill policy, which authorized park 
rangers to shoot to kill suspected poachers if they felt their safety or the security of the animal 
was threatened (Peluso 1993; Akama 1996; Orenstein 2013).  
Despite a slight resurgence in elephant populations during the 1990s, poaching rates 
remained high into the 21st century. As the price of ivory climbed to more than $2,100 US 
dollars per kilo, an estimated 100,000 elephants were killed between 2010 and 2012 (Stiles 
2004). Today, the BBC estimates that fewer than 415,000 African elephants remain (BBC 2018). 
While Kenya’s poaching rates are lower than many other sub-Saharan African nations, ivory 
poaching is still a concern. A 2017 press release from the CITES’ MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal 
Killing of Elephants) Program revealed that while the steady increase in the levels of ivory 
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poaching in Kenya had stopped, they remained far above elephant’s natural growth rate, leading 
to continue population declines (CITES 2006).  
These declines, coupled with a still thriving black market ivory trade, are particularly 
concerning to the Kenyan government and the international community due to alleged 
connections between ivory sales and criminal gangs operating in arms and human trafficking and 
the funding of terrorist groups like al Shabaab and Boko Haram (White 2013; Bergenas and 
Knight 2015; Haenlein et al. 2016). 
 Since 2011, Kenya has been a repeated target of al-Qaeda-linked Islamic extremist 
group, al-Shabaab (Anderson and McKnight 2014). Consequently, ivory poaching has expanded 
beyond simply a threat to biodiversity to become a matter of national security and 
counterterrorism. In response, there has been a conscious escalation in Kenya’s militarized 
approach to protected area enforcement. Examples of this militarization include the use of 
military-grade surveillance technologies like drones and infrared night vision goggles, the 
employment of paramilitary forces as rangers in private conservancies, and calls for stricter legal 
punishments for poachers including life time jail sentences and death penalties (Simlai 2015; 
Wich 2015; Duffy 2016; Barbora 2017). It is the widespread use and acceptance of these violent 
policies in conservation that we specifically examine.  
Kenya’s history of protected area management provides a useful baseline for 
understanding its contemporary conservation landscape. Additionally, recognizing the historic 
marginalization and restriction of local people is critical for understanding the potential 
ramifications and human rights implications of recent militarized policies and how this violence 
can be seen as an extension of the colonial project. Further, it reflects the complex history of 
“poaching” and the historical assumptions embedded in the term poacher that is often missing 
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from contemporary discussions. In the next section, I analyze how the media defines “the 
poacher” and situates these individuals within an excepted space where violence is permissible.  
 
Media Analysis 
To understand the media’s role in the acceptance of violent protected area enforcement 
policies, we analyze how the media frames the poacher to construct a particular identity. We then 
consider how this identity contributes to the legitimization of violence in conservation. To 
answer these research questions, we conducted a systematic analysis of news articles discussing 
African ivory poaching.  
 
Methods 
A total of 436 news articles about ivory poaching were identified using a Lexus Nexus 
search. After duplicates and articles discussing other forms of wildlife poaching were removed, a 
total of 405 remained for analysis. To investigate the potential differences in how poachers are 
depicted and perceived in different temporal and geographic spaces, news articles were sourced 
from four regions (East Africa, East Asia, Europe, and North America) and from the forty-year 
time period of 1980 to 2018. Table 1 details the exact number of articles sourced from each 
region and time period. 
 As we were only able to access articles that had been published online in the Lexus 
Nexus database, we were limited with the number available from East Africa from 1980-1989 
and 1990-1999 and from East Asia from 1990-1999, as well as the diversity of publications we 
could draw on from each region.  Examples of publications include The New York Times (US), 
The Standard (Kenya), The Guardian (UK), and The South China Post (China), but a range of 
publications were used from each region.  
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Table 1. Number of articles analyzed from each time period and geographic region.  
 
Using a qualitative directed content approach (Shannon 2005), news articles were read 
and coded along eleven pre-identified categories:  
(1) the ethnicity/nationality of the poacher; 
(2) references to terrorism or criminal syndicates; 
(3) characterization of local/indigenous people; 
(4) discussion of corruption or mismanagement and by whom; 
(5) whether shoot to kill narratives were invoked; 
(6) the final destination of the ivory; 
(7) the technology used by the poacher; 
(8) the technology used by protected area or state officials; 
(9) the identification of the “middlepeople”, or individual/groups who are neither directly 
involved in the killing of the animal nor the final consumer but are involved in the 
transit of ivory; 
(10) efforts to reduce acts of poaching are specifically or anecdotally attributed to donor 
agencies and/or NGOs and who those agencies are; 
 East Africa East Asia Europe North America 
1980-1989 0 6 26 26 
1990-1999 3 29 33 21 
2000-2009 13 30 28 11 
2010-2018 66 30 40 43 
Total 82 95 127 101 
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(11) what are the proposed interventions or solutions. These categories were selected as 
they most clearly demonstrate the techniques the media uses to construct the identity 
of poachers. 
These categories were selected as they represent the types of information typically reported in 
news articles about ivory poaching, and so reflect the common frames the media uses to define 
an identity for poachers. Further, these specific coding categories allowed us to track the 
evolution of how the media depicts poachers over time. This provides important information 
regarding the progression of public perceptions of poachers and protected area management.  
 
Results 
 The analysis of the news articles revealed several important trends. First, eighty nine 
percent of articles surveyed did not provide any identifying information – ethnicity, nationality, 
or other first-person identification –  for poachers. These articles either ambiguously referred to 
“the poacher” without providing additional clarifying details or discussed poaching in the 
abstract without mentioning the human actors involved. This lack of identification persisted 
across time and geographic region, but was pronounced in East Asia, totaling to ninety-seven 
percent of articles analyzed. Only eleven percent the articles surveyed provided information on 
the ethnic or national identity of poachers. Overall, sixteen different ethnicities were ascribed to 
poachers (i.e. “Mozambican”, “Zimbabwean”, “Chinese” or “African”), with the most common 
being “Somali”. Finally, of the 405 articles analyzed, only six provided any other identifying 
information for poachers, whether it be names, occupations, or testimonies from the alleged 
poacher or those that knew them. 
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Figure 2. Graph of frequency of media identification of poachers. 
 
In addition to this anonymization, the media also actively villainized poachers. Of the 
articles analyzed for this research, seventy-one percent included references to negative 
stereotypes about poachers. Phrases like, “disgruntled, underpaid park employees”iv or “local 
youth with nothing to dov” emphasize a particular view of who poachers are that perpetuates 
simplistic and stereotypical tropes. Additionally, many of the articles surveyed used descriptors 
like “greedy”vi, “lazy”vii, or “cruel”viii to describe poachers and referenced their “depravity” 
through frequent invocations of the existence of criminal poaching syndicatesix and the alleged 
relationship between ivory sales and Islamic terrorist groupsx. These results reflect the ways in 
which the media, through how it chooses to depict poachers, constructs these individuals as 
criminals despite including little identifying or humanizing information. 
 
 
 
89% 
10% 
1% 
No identifying information given
Ethnicity and/or nationality of poacher given
Other first-preson identifier given
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Figure 3. Types of characteristic ascribed to poachers by the media 
 
News articles referenced local communities in their descriptions of ivory poaching in 
twenty-one percent of articles, with the vast majority of these coming from European or North 
American publications. Of these references, fifty-seven percent described local communities in 
negative terms, either as being poachers themselves or as aiding and abetting suspected poachers. 
Eight percent described local communities as the “victims” of poaching by describing the violent 
behavior of poachers against local people and their forced complicity due to fears of violent 
retribution should they refuse.   
References to corruption were infrequent but, when they occurred, were almost always in 
relation to local or national governments or the local rangers and wildlife officials. Allegations of 
corruption were never invoked against Western or international conservation NGOs or managers 
of private conservancies and other white conservationists. Further, despite empirical evidence 
that the United States and the United Kingdom serve as major ivory destinations (Strauss 2015), 
70%
3%
27%
Negative Neutral 
Positive No Characteristics given
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news articles from Europe and the United States discussing the final destination of illegal ivory 
almost exclusively incriminated Asian countries, typically China and Japan.  
 The media analysis also revealed a common narrative for explaining the severity of the 
recent ivory poaching “crisis” - poachers use of more sophisticated weapons and technology like 
assault rifles, silencers, and helicoptersxi. These references were prevalent in articles published 
between 2010 and 2018 from all four geographic regions, but were especially common in 
European news articles, occurring in ninety-three percent from the 2010-2018 period.  
This narrative of poacher’s use of sophisticated weapons and technology coincided with a 
rise in allegations of criminal poaching syndicates and connections between illegal ivory sales 
and the funding of Islamic terrorist groups like al Shabaab, particularly in European and North 
American publications. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 2013 al Shabaab attack on the 
Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, this alleged relationship between ivory sales and terrorism 
became considerably more prominent in East African articles on ivory poaching, occurring in 
eighty-three percent since 2013 (RUSI 2018).  
Additionally, in all geographic regions, but particularly East Africa, there was a definitive 
increase over time in media reports invoking increased law enforcement and the use of more 
sophisticated technology by protected areas as the needed solutions to poaching, including 
advanced military training for rangers, the use of drones or other surveillance technologies, and 
the official implementation of shoot-to-kill. Fifty-five percent of articles from the 2010-2018 
period advocated for increased law enforcement and an additional twenty percent argued for 
better technology to increase the capacity of ranger teams. In comparison, for both the 1990-
1999 and the 2000-2009 time periods, only nineteen percent of articles advocated for increased 
law enforcement and only six percent for increased technology. Finally, despite its widespread 
use in Southern Africa and its unofficial endorsement in East Africa, shoot-to-kill policies were 
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infrequently mentioned in news articles. Only thirty-six articles contained any reference to the 
policy or its use and those references were minimal without further discussion of its controversial 
nature nor its ethical and human rights implications.   
 
Discussion 
 From this analysis, several conclusions regarding the media’ construction of “the 
poacher” can be drawn. First, by rarely giving identifying information about poachers to readers, 
the media anonymizes them and, in so doing, strips them of their position within society. No 
longer seen as neighbors, friends, or fellow members of the national community, these 
individuals are absorbed into the amorphous category of “poachers” against whom violence is 
permissible. Through this anonymization, poachers fall into an excepted space because they are 
no longer seen as a human deserving of empathy or forgiveness, but as an unidentified criminal. 
Divested of their humanity, it becomes easier for the public and conservation actors to justify 
violence against them.  
But while poachers are denied an identity, in other instances of violence like terrorism or 
murder, the media floods the public with information about the identity of the alleged 
perpetrators. For example, in the aftermath of the bombings at the Boston Marathon and the 
Manchester Arena, news outlets published lengthy descriptions of suspects within hours, 
complete with life histories and interviews with family, friends, and acquaintances. While not 
analogous crimes, this juxtaposition does introduce the question of why, for some types of 
violence, perpetrators identities are at the forefront of discussions while, in other types of 
violence, the opposite occurs?  
Second, while the occasional inclusion of information about the ethnicity or nationality of 
poachers does provide some identifying information, it still remains ambiguous with little true 
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humanizing information. Moreover, by equating an ethnicity or nationality with poaching and its 
related negative stigmas, the media reinforces society’s unfavorable views of particular ethnic 
groups. This is particularly problematic in, for example, Kenya where those of Somali descent 
are widely viewed by much of Kenyan society as “dangerous” or “criminals”, particularly in the 
aftermath of Al-Shabaab attacks like Westgate and the Riverside Complex attacks (Scharrer 
2018). Linking the idea of poaching with those of Somali descent may exacerbate existing ethnic 
tension in the country or result in the use of racial profiling by conservation actors.  
Third, the results of the media analysis reflect how the media constructs poachers as 
villainous criminals who are undeserving of the state and society’s sympathy and protection. By 
ascribing characteristics like “greedy”, “cruel”, and “lazy”, the media produces an image of 
poachers that is synonymous with violence and criminality. Further, by establishing linkages 
between poachers and criminal enterprises like human and arms trafficking, narcotraffic, and 
terrorism and emphasizing their use of dangerous weapons and technology, the media constructs 
poachers pose a legitimate threat against the welfare of the nation and those in its domain, 
including wildlife (Fletcher 2018).  
As a space of exception emerges around individuals when they are perceived as 
endangering the harmony of the nation, constructing poachers as criminals who engage in violent 
acts against others places them within this excepted space. Here, they are no longer perceived as 
people, but rather as legitimate threats against whom violence is permissible. Further, as readers 
rarely receive humanizing information that contradicts this image of poachers and most will 
never interact directly with them, this construction is rarely contested. With the image of the 
poacher as a violent criminal firmly rooted in mind, when violence is used against them, the 
public can rationalize this as a necessary act for safeguarding the nation and protecting those that 
fall within its domain. Thus, violent policies like shoot-to-kill or the institution of life time jail 
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sentences, which would typically be seen in other spaces as violating basic principles of human 
rights, are justifiable given their purpose is to protect the nation and its heritage.  
Finally, through the media’s descriptions of local communities’ involvement in poaching 
and its principal focus on the alleged corruption of local authorities, Western news sources 
convey a message that others, and not Westerners, are singularly to blame for the poaching crisis. 
This is further reinforced by the Western media’s focus on Asian countries as the primary 
importers of ivory despite the large body of empirical evidence that implicate the United States 
and the United Kingdom as significant ivory importing hubs (Wyler and Sheikh 2008; Stiles and 
Martin 2009; Lau et al. 2016). Through this selective focus, Western nations mask their 
complacency in the ivory trade and reinforce racially motivated stereotypes of poachers that 
become further entrenched without the addition of clarifying and humanizing information. In this 
way, the Western media “whitewashes” poaching and the ivory trade and further position 
“poachers” as others within an excepted space.  
Moreover, due to the excepted nature of poachers, the scale of violence occurring in 
African protected areas remains largely hidden from view. When an individual is killed in a 
protected area, particularly under suspect circumstances, once they have been established as a 
poacher, little additional investigation occurs, regardless of the veracity of this classification. 
This occurs because, as Lunstrum (2017) argues, the deaths of poachers are perceived, not as 
homicides, but as necessary acts for conservation. This violence rarely then elicits the concern of 
conservation organizations, human rights bodies, or the general public because it is not seen as 
being inflicted upon a person but rather on a “criminal” who was deserving of this fate. As such, 
this violence goes largely unnoticed to become deeply intertwined into the everyday practices of 
protected area management. 
 33 
The media content analysis reveals that readers rarely receive identifying information 
about poachers from the media and, when they do, it is either ambiguously focused on ethnic or 
national origin or the identity reproduces existing one-dimensional stereotypes, like corrupt 
officials or restless youths. Further, through the assigning of negative characteristics like greed 
and cruelty and associating poachers with terrorism, the media produces an image of the poacher 
that is tantamount to a criminal. Thus, we see a trend emerge in the media where poachers are 
simultaneously de-identified and vilified. This contributes to their position within a space of 
exception where violence is justified because the public does not consider them a person 
deserving of protection, but rather as an unidentified criminal.  
These results reflect the role of the media in constructing the identity and context of the 
poacher that cast them as deserving targets of victims. While the media’s contribution is an 
important component in understanding how violence in conservation has become accepted, it is 
necessary to further interrogate how conservation actors contribute to this discourse as the 
executors of violent protected area policies. In the following section, I unpack the specific ways 
that conservation practitioners, NGOs, and wildlife rangers construct an image of “the poacher” 
that justifies the implementation of violent protected area policies.  
 
 
Part II: “On-The-Ground” Realities 
 To better answer questions of how and why violent protected area policies have become 
accepted practices in conservation, we analyze how central conservation actors contribute to the 
discourse on ivory poaching. To do so, I examine how different conservation actors – 
conservation policy officials, conservation NGO workers, and wildlife rangers – perceive 
poachers and poaching. I then explore how these different understandings shape the expression 
 34 
of violence in conservation. To achieve this, I conducted empirical fieldwork through first person 
interviews with conservation officials, NGOs, and wildlife rangers was conducted. 
 
Methods 
Initial interview subjects were identified through our existing connections in Kenya and 
were contacted if they could be classified into one of the three categories we defined as central 
conservation actors – conservation officials, employees of domestic or international conservation 
NGOs, and wildlife rangers (Figure 4). We selected these categories because these groups most 
directly interact with poachers, act as important lobbyists for anti-poaching, and execute anti-
poaching policies. For these reasons, these categories of stakeholders should, in theory, have the 
best understanding of poachers and poaching to elucidate how violence in conservation is 
justified by central actors. We received the University of Michigan’s Institutional Review Board 
approval (HUM00142008) in April of 2018 with a no more than minimal risk assessment.  
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Figure 4. Analyzed groups of central conservation actors 
 
I intentionally chose not to interview poachers for several reasons. First, due to the 
potential dangers associated with accessing these individuals, obtaining the necessary 
Institutional Review Board approval would have been a considerable challenge. Second, to 
develop the trust and rapport necessary for poachers to frankly discuss their actions and 
motivations would necessitate substantial time in the field that was impossible due to the time 
restrictions of the Master’s program. And, due to my positionality, as a white European from a 
US-based institution, there were concerns, both ethically and practically, about how to gain 
access to this informant network. Third, I had concerns about the ethical implications of 
conducting these interviews, particularly the repercussions of a data breach should subject 
testimonies be obtained by the state. While all measures would be taken to ensure confidentiality 
and protect the identities of informants, there would be serious legal implications for participants 
should data be leaked.   
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It also necessary to emphasize that the goal of this research was not to identify who 
poachers were but rather to highlight our lack of this knowledge despite the widespread use and 
acceptance of violence. With this goal in mind, I felt that focusing on understanding how those 
enacting these policies understand poachers and poaching was congruent with the stated research 
goals. However, should research in this area progress, interviewing poachers will be essential.  
After initial participants were contacted, a snowball sampling technique via word-of-
mouth recommendations was used to identify additional participants. Participants were asked a 
series of open-ended questions regarding their personal experiences with poachers, their 
understanding of how poaching and protected area enforcement has changed over time, and their 
perceptions of various militarized protected area enforcement and anti-poaching policies – 
fences; fines; the use of technology i.e. surveillance systems, DNA technology, tracking devices; 
militarized training and weapons; and persecutory policies like shoot-to-kill and lifetime jail 
sentences. These specific categories were identified as they represent the evolution of protected 
area enforcement as a response to escalating poaching and capture the common ways that 
violence is expressed in conservation. Interviews were recorded – with permission –   
transcribed, and analyzed to determine trends in how central conservation actors identify and 
describe poachers and approach protected area enforcement. The testimonies of conservation 
actors that are included in this analysis are direct quotations and some may be upsetting. Despite 
the offensive nature of some, we chose to retain the exact wordings of participant to better 
capture the reality of conservation in Kenya.  
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Results 
 Interviews illuminated several important themes in how central conservation actors 
describe and understand poachers that provide critical insights into how conservation violence is 
expressed and justified. These themes fall into three broad processes that together explain how 
poachers are situated within an excepted space – de-identification, construction, and moral 
restructuring. In this section, I will present evidence from interviews that demonstrate how 
conservation actors contribute to each process and explore potential differences in the 
contributions of each group of actors (conservation officials, conservation NGOs, and wildlife 
rangers).  
 The first process, de-identification, was evident in interviews with all three categories of 
conservation actors and is reflected in the notion that interviewed participants could not 
definitively identify who poachers typically are or where they come from. Across all categories, 
there was a significant lack of clarity between and within subjects regarding the identity of 
poachers. Frontline rangers often contradicted themselves during a single interview, beginning 
by conclusively stating that poachers came from one area before later stating the opposite. This is 
exemplified in the below interaction.  
 
“In your experiences, who are typical poachers and where do they come 
from?” 
 
“Foreigners. They come from Tanzania, Somali, some from Ethiopia to 
hunt elephant here. Then they work with the Chinese to get the ivory out.” 
 
“So, poachers in this area are typically not Kenyan?” 
 
“No, it’s also locals. Kenyans can’t blame others. The people around the 
parks come in to graze their cattle and see an elephant, so they shoot it. 
It’s opportunistic.” 
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- Sampson1, wildlife ranger 
 
In addition to discrepancies in individual testimonies, there was also significant variation 
between the various subjects interviewed regarding the identities of poachers. The ethnic of 
national identities ascribed to poachers varied widely, from members of the local Kenyan 
communities bordering the parks to demilitarized Somali soldiers or foreigners from West 
Africa.  
“When Somalia stabilized a bit, there were all these soldiers that had a 
bunch of weapons and nothing to do. So, they came to Kenya to make 
money by poaching elephants and rhino.” 
 
- John, protected area official 
 
Other interview subjects refused to attempt to identify who poachers were, stating that it 
was impossible to preemptively know this information. While this occurred across the three 
categories of stakeholders, stating directly that it was impossible to determine the identities of 
poachers arose most commonly in interviews with conservation officials. These individuals also 
advanced the belief that attempting to identify poachers beforehand would be an inefficient use 
of time and resources, particularly given the traditionally reactionary nature of protected area 
enforcement.   
“I get why you’re asking about who poachers in our experiences have 
been but I honestly don’t think there is one ‘type’ of person who poaches. 
Plus, it’s really hard to know this information up front. And I don’t even 
think it makes sense to try and figure this out. Think about how much time 
and money would get wasted trying to figure out something that’s 
impossible to really know… And what would this knowledge even do? 
                                                
1 All names used in this paper are pseudonyms in order to protect the identities of 
interviewees.  
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We’re so focused on responding that we just don’t have the time to do 
anything with it even if we had it.”  
 
- Moses, park warden 
In contrast, employees at conservation NGOs often emphasized that identifying poachers 
was difficult because anyone could be a poacher.  
 “Poachers can be anyone. Think about it, right, they could be people from 
the communities around the parks, they could be coming over the border 
from Tanzania or Somali or even as far away as West Africa. And, let’s 
not forget about corruption. The very guys employed to defend these 
species might be poaching them. It’s a bit of crapshoot honestly.”  
 
- Samuel, employee at conservation NGO 
 
 
In addition to this lack of clarity around the national or ethnic identities, interviewed 
subjects also never provided first person identification for poachers and rarely provided non-
ethnic or national identities. Only wildlife rangers occasionally provided information about the 
types of occupations that alleged “poachers” typically held but these also varied widely. For 
example:  
“…so this one time, we find a dead elephant and the tusks are missing. We 
go into the communities around here and start kicking down some doors. 
At first they won’t talk but, pretty soon, we got some good information 
that led us… guess where?... The chief’s house! Guy was sitting on like 
hundreds of pounds of ivory just waiting until he could get it to the port. 
So, while we try to build trust in the communities, sometimes they’re the 
guys doing it [poaching].” 
 
- Mark, wildlife ranger 
 
and 
“With all this construction by the Chinese on the highway from Nairobi to 
the Mara, it’s raised some questions for me. You remember that the fences 
on the road used to be filled with dead wildlife. Like carcasses 
everywhere. And now, there’s none. You noticed that, right? I’m talking 
not one dead antelope, gazelle, nothing. A bit coincidental with all the 
Chinese here, you know. These [racial slur] are eating everything! I heard 
they’re paying the Maasai to pick up the dead animals and bring it to them 
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as bush meat. So, who’s to say they’re not killing the live ones too. And 
that includes the elephants….” 
 
- Elliot, head of anti-poaching ranger force 
 
The racism overt in the second quotation also reflects the prejudiced assumptions 
embedded in the idea of the poacher that many participants displayed. Despite conservation 
actors’ inability to offer concrete and consistent information about the identities of poachers, 
several, primarily conservation officials, invoked racist explanations for why individuals poach, 
for example saying:  
“it’s in their DNA. They can’t help it, it’s just what they do”  
- David, private conservancy manager 
and 
“…these are poaching villages. Those guys are out there and, no matter 
what we do to try and prevent it, it’s only a matter of time before they go 
back to what they know. It’s like a bloodlust or something.”  
 
- Wycliffe, head of security at a state protected area 
 
 
These types of explanations and the derogatory language used in reference to different 
groups reveals the highly racialized landscape of conservation that becomes further 
problematized when considering the violence that these same officials advocate for. 
The inconsistent and ambiguous identification given by all three categories of 
conservation actors is consistent with the results of the media analysis in that poachers are 
actively stripped of an identity. The implications of this de-identification will be discussed at 
length later in the analysis.  
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In addition to this de-identification, conservation actors also actively construct the ideas 
of poachers and poaching. This process occurs in several ways. First, conservation officials and 
wildlife rangers, those who regularly engage with the notion of poaching, construct it as a crisis – 
one where the use of excessive force against alleged enemies is justifiable – by producing 
associations between poaching and warfare and disease. For example:  
 
“…poaching is a war. I would classify it as a war. It’s a form of bush 
warfare because you have guys opening fire on you. It’s a fight for your 
life, your rangers lives, and then you’re also trying to capture or kill the 
guys firing at you. It’s utter insanity when you’re in the thick of things.” 
 
- Josef, wildlife ranger at private conservancy 
 
 
and 
 
 
"It [poaching] was like an infection that just kept spreading. We tried to 
contain it but then there would be another outbreak a park over. It was like 
it was never ending and it just didn’t matter what we did to try and stop 
it.” 
- George, head of security 
 
 This construction of poaching as a crisis, particularly as a form of warfare, was also 
evident throughout the actual fieldwork process. While at a conservancy interviewing park 
officials and rangers, I was asked to accompany the team on an effort to treat an injured elephant 
who had allegedly been shot by poachers. From the moment the process began, it felt like 
warzone. Members of the team wore camouflage, with some in bullet proof vests carrying large 
assault-style weapons, and referred to each other using military call signs like “Alpha One” or 
“Delta Squad”. The actual operation entailed rangers hanging on the backs of land rovers that 
sped across savannah and through acacia forests while drivers barked orders into their two-way 
radios about the position of the “target”. Thus, the combination of how conservation officials and 
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wildlife rangers discuss poaching and act in their day-to-day operations construct it as a crisis 
that necessitates force to manage.  
The second process of construction that works in parallel to this crisis production is 
through conservation actors’ positioning of poachers as the “enemy”. Consistent with the result 
of the media analysis, interviewed participants across the three categories frequently referred to 
the wickedness of poachers, describing them as “greedy”, “cruel”, and “lazy”. As one 
participation stated:   
 
“It’s cruel to shoot an elephant. They’re highly intelligent creatures, they 
can understand what’s going on.” 
 
- Silas, conservation NGO worker 
 
     and 
 
“They’re motivated by money. It’s all greed. They want a new cellphone 
or Nike shoes but they don’t want to work hard. They’re too lazy to go and 
find a real job so they take the easy way out and shoot an elephant.”  
 
- Martin, head of anti-poaching  
  
In addition, conservation actors, and particularly the conservation officials and rangers, 
created connections between poachers and criminality, particularly through testaments to the 
existence of criminal syndicates. 
“It’s not so much one poacher as much as it’s a chain. That’s how I would 
think about it, a chain. The guy who pulls the trigger leads to someone in 
the village, who goes to someone in the port, who transports it to the 
kingpin in China. It’s this entire network of criminals” 
 
- Denis, wildlife ranger 
 
and 
 
 
“They come in with their AK-47s and G3s, silencers and shoot one 
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[elephant] after another. And you know, they’ve realized that their firearm 
can be a source of income too and so they’re also using it to rob vehicles, 
houses, harass community members. They rob tourists when they can. 
They belong to the same gangs that run arms in the region, too”.  
 
- Jeffrey, state wildlife official 
 
 
While, like the results of the media analysis, conservation NGO workers reproduced the 
narrative of ivory sales funding terrorist activities, conservation officials and wildlife rangers 
refuted this linkage, calling it unsubstantiated.  
“Yeah, you hear that all the time but I don’t believe it. Sure, it’s a sexy 
narrative and it gets people’s attention but it doesn’t hold up. Al Shabaab 
makes way more money from drug trafficking than they would get from 
ivory so it doesn’t make sense. Plus, the trade is under a microscope. If it 
was true, there would be a lot more evidence of it and we don’t see that.”  
 
- Edwin, manager of state protected area  
 
Through ascribing negative characteristics like greed, cruelty, and laziness to poachers 
and associating them with criminal enterprises, conservation actors are constructing an identity 
for poachers that cast them as the “enemies”. Through the constructions of a crisis and an enemy 
against whom violence is necessary, private and state conservation actors justify the use of 
violent force within protected area enforcement, claiming it as essential for creating the “climate 
of fear” necessary to effectively address this ‘crisis’. While the belief in the need to “de-
incentive” poaching by makings its costs exceed its benefits was evident in the testimonies from 
all three categories of stakeholders, advocating for using violence to accomplish this goal was 
unique to conservation officials and wildlife rangers:  
“Fear is the only way to stop poaching, make poachers afraid of the 
consequences... If they get killed, their family and friends will think twice 
about shooting an elephant… And making the communities more afraid of 
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you than they are of poachers is the only way to get them to tell you 
what’s going on.” 
 
- Charles, head of security at private conservancy  
 
and  
 
“I’m a big proponent of what I call ‘door-kicking’. You lay people flat on 
their faces, chop off some hands, and they start talking real quick.” 
 
- Francis, warden of state protected area 
 
As the above quotation reflects, instilling fear was synonymous with the use of violence, 
often against local communities, and reflects the increasing violence of protected area 
management. However, while conservation officials and wildlife rangers advocated for more 
militarized and violent practices to manage poaching, conservation NGO workers advocated for 
increased legal punishments through the levying of harsher fines and lengthier jail sentences.  
 
 
“The legal system just isn’t working for us right now. When we are able to 
get a conviction, they go to jail for a few months or pay a small fine and 
then they go free. You can understand how people get frustrated by this. 
The punishment doesn’t fit the crime right now. But increasing these fines 
and making the jail terms longer will make the costs outweigh the benefits 
of poaching.” 
 
- Brian, head of local conservation NGO 
 
The final process through which we can see poachers’ placement within a space 
of exception by conservation actors is through conservation’s moral restructuring. The 
discursive positioning of poachers within an excepted space, where they are perceived as 
sub-human and so undeserving of the rights and protections afforded to other members of 
society, is evidenced in participant discussions of human rights, or a lack thereof. 
Conservation actors, particularly wildlife rangers and conservation officials, often 
 45 
highlighted the notion that poachers were not entitled to the same rights as other citizens, 
remarking for example: 
 “…a poacher doesn’t have any rights. If you break the law, why should 
the law protect you?”.  
 
- Michael, wildlife ranger 
 
This quotation reflects the view by many conservation actors that poachers are 
criminals who ignore state laws for their own gains and so are underserving of those 
laws’ protections. Michael’s testimony further exemplifies the notion that poachers exist 
within an excepted space where they are not entitled to the protection of the state.   
Conservation actors also elevated animal lives over the lives of poachers, 
exemplifying Neumann (2004)’s restructuring of conservation’s moral geography where 
elephants are assigned a higher moral standing than certain people. This reorganization of 
society’s moral hierarchy is demonstrated in the following participant’s comment:  
“I guess it comes down to human rights vs animal rights. And if you ask 
me, an elephant is worth 10 times one of their [poachers] lives."  
 
- Richard, state conservancy official 
 
 
Thus, while there was recognition of the human rights implications of these militarized 
policies, participants either explicitly stated or indicated a belief that the need to protect 
elephants and rhino outweighed the value of human lives. 
 Interviews with central conservation actors reveal their role in defining the identity and 
context of the poacher through the processes of de-identification, construction, and moral 
restructuring. In the following section, we discuss the implications of these processes for how 
violence in conservation is justified. 
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Discussion 
Interviews with conservation actors revealed a process of “othering” that occurs in 
conservation. Othering is defined as the reductive process of labelling and defining a person as 
subaltern, thereby excluding and displacing them to the margins of society where mainstream 
social norms do not apply (Canales 2000; Gallaher et al. 2009; Jensen 2011). The “othering” of 
the poacher becomes evident in the testimonies of central conservation actors and occurs in the 
three processes described above: de-identification, construction of a “crisis” and “enemy”, and 
the moral restructuring of conservation. By “othering” poachers, conservation actors justify their 
governing through fear that results in the pervasive securitization of protected areas. We first 
examine how the othering of poachers occurs through de-identification, construction, and moral 
restructuring before considering how “othering” has resulted in a “governance through fear” 
mentality and subsequent militarization.  
During interviews with central conservation actors, the process of de-identification 
becomes clear as, just as with the media portrayals, poachers are stripped of their humanity to 
become nameless and faceless bodies. Without an identity and thus devoid of humanity, 
poachers are positioned in a space of exception where the use of violence against them is 
permissible because there is no human face to those harmed. As the interviews revealed, there is 
a lack of understanding of who exactly are impacted by conservation violence by those 
responsible for executing it. As such, we see significant levels of violence sanctioned against 
individuals despite no knowledge of who they are and, more importantly, why they engage in 
these behaviors. As Campbell (1998) demonstrates in his analysis of Bosnia, masking a groups’ 
identities and human characteristics facilitates the use of violence against them as the human 
victims affected by this violence is not discernable.  In first removing their humanity and the 
common characteristics they share with other societal groups, conservation actors begin the 
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process of “othering” poachers to push them to the fringes of society where they become placed 
in a space of exception.  
 In addition to de-identification, interviews with conservation officials also revealed the 
highly racialized landscape of conservation and the assumptions embedded into the idea of the 
“poacher”. These stereotypical and racist beliefs become further problematized when we 
consider who is responsible for enacting these violent policies. Many of Kenya’s conservationists 
are white, descendants of those who benefited under Britain’s colonial occupation of Kenya or 
transplants from other colonized African nations. Thus, we see a situation where violence is 
enacted against largely black, impoverished populations at the behest of wealthy, often white, 
elites. The use of racist rhetoric is a core tenant in “othering” as stereotypical perceptions about 
race and ethnicity are frequently used as a means to construct the subaltern “Other” (Bailey and 
Harindranath 2005; Rich and Troudi 2006; Dervin 2015).   
 In addition to their de-identification, conservation actors also “other” poachers to position 
them within an exception space through the ascription of negative characteristics and attributes 
to them. Despite an inability to offer concrete identifiers to poachers, conservation actors 
unanimously attributed negative characteristics to poachers like greed, cruelty and laziness. 
Through these descriptions and the construction of poachers as “criminals” through assertions of 
poaching syndicates and criminal behavior, conservation actors construct them as deserving 
targets of violence. Without the inclusion of any humanizing information, poachers continue to 
exist within an excepted space where violence is acceptable because they perceived as violent 
criminals.  
 The creation of a poaching “crisis” through allusions to warfare and disease further 
produces a space where violence against people is justifiable. First, the construction of a crisis 
requires the simultaneous construction of a threat – in the case of conservation, poachers. The 
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creation of a poaching crisis further casts poachers as violent criminals, creating a belief that 
only through violence can this crisis be managed. Research has also revealed that society is 
typically more accepting of the use of force during emergency situations than during times of 
perceived peace (Hoffman 1973; Morabito et al., 2012). As such, by constructing poaching as an 
urgent crisis – a war or disease epidemic –violent actions, like shoot-to-kill or death penalties, 
are interpreted as morally permissible in light of the extenuating circumstances.  
Additionally, by equating poaching with a ‘war’, conservationists emphasize the military 
command and control structure of conservation. This was exemplified in the anecdote of the 
elephant treatment exercise where orders were passed down by ‘superiors’ to rangers who 
fulfilled these commands without hesitation. This emphasis on a military hierarchy in which 
decisions by leadership are not questioned reflects how biopower gets enacted in conservation. 
The state and managers of private conservancies make a decision about who must die to allow 
wild animals to live and the rangers execute these decisions without question. This obedience 
legitimizes their biopower and thus reinforces the state and private conservation elite’s droit de 
glaive.  
In constructing poachers as criminals by assigning negative attributes and creating 
associations between poaching and crises, the “othering” poachers is strengthened. These 
stereotypical and negative characteristics of poachers and the perception that they are enemies in 
a life or death struggle become the justification for their separation from society. The belief that 
poachers pose a threat also reinforces the perception that mainstream social norms and protection 
should not apply to them, constructing poachers as undeserving of protection by the state’s laws.  
Finally, discussions of human and animal rights by conservation actors reflect the moral 
restructuring of conservation –  where elephants and rhino are situated above people – that 
Neumann (2005) described. As conservation actors emphasize this restructuring of 
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conservation’s moral geography, violent retribution against poachers by the state becomes 
perceived as morally just and necessary. Through this restructuring of society’s hierarchy, 
poachers are further constructed as sub-human and subaltern, emphasizing their “othering” and 
status in an excepted space.  
 Through this process of “othering” where poachers are positioned in a space of exception, 
the perception arises that this poaching “crisis” can only be managed through fear. This 
“governance through fear” logic is reflective of the space of exception around conservation and 
anti-poaching, where moral and legal judgement has been abandoned in favor of fear and 
violence. “Door kicking”, as one interviewee put it, is emblematic of the violent landscape of 
conservation and the suspension of society’s ethical and moral responsibility to protect people 
from violence. To govern through fear and violence thus necessitates the increased militarization 
and securitization that is occurring in conservation. We see then how, through “othering” the 
poacher and placing them in a space of exception, conservation actors justify a governance 
through fear and violence that results in the implementation of militarized and securitized 
protected area policies 
   The results of this fieldwork were consistent with results from the media analysis 
– poachers are actively anonymized, dehumanized, and vilified by those centrally 
involved in conservation. It is through the media and conservationists’ descriptions of 
poachers that this group has been “othered” and placed within a space of exception to be 
undeserving of the rights afforded to other members of society. This culminates in a 
perception that governing through fear and violence is necessary to manage the subaltern 
“others”, resulting in the increased securitization of conservation.  
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Paradoxes in Making Live and Letting Die 
The results of this research illuminate why society, as viewed through the lens of 
the media, views violence in protected areas as acceptable, as the media and conservation 
actors’ discursive construction of the identity and context of the poacher positions them 
within a space of exception where violence is tolerated. But, the creation of a space of 
exception also helps us understand how violence has initially become part of the state’s 
repertoire of natural resource control and governance. Specifically, we extend our 
analysis to understand more broadly how the state rationalizes its reliance on violence 
despite the fact that it derives its legitimacy from its claims to protect the lives of those in 
its domain. We use the case of conservation violence and the creation of a space of 
exception around poachers to analyze how the state reconciles its seemingly 
contradictory use of violence against its own people to fulfil its agendas.  
Various scholars have demonstrated how the state rules through biopower, legitimizing 
itself on its claim to protect the lives of its citizens (Rabinow & Rose 2006; Perron et al. 2005; 
Lazzarato 2002; Oels 2005). The “making live and letting die” element of biopower, droit de 
glaive, is central to the state’s power, as the ability to make decisions over the lives of its citizens 
is critical for defining the sovereignty of the modern nation state.  
However, the state’s use of violence in governance calls forth a paradoxical question 
(Dolan 2005): how does a form of authority that is fundamentally justified on its claims to 
protect life condone the use of deadly force? If the state emphasizes its power through the 
management and increase of the lives under its control, how does one understand the violence 
and killing at the heart of this power?  
This ‘paradox of biopwer’ has important implications for how conservation is understood 
as violence and the sovereign right to kill fundamentally underpins it, from militarized 
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enforcement strategies to shoot-to-kill policies. As such, understanding how the state resolves 
this paradox is necessary for understanding conservation violence and violent natural resource 
control more broadly.    
But, how exactly does the state accomplish this? I argue that the state’s solution is to 
construct a legitimate threat to the majority of the lives its purports to defend which, in the case 
of conservation, includes wildlife. The construction of a poaching crisis and the equating of ivory 
poaching with a national security issue establish them as that threat to the nation and its people. 
 But, the construction of a threat is not enough – for the rest of its citizens to accept the 
use of violence, that threat must fall outside the state’s bio-political order, or those considered 
under the state’s protection. The positioning of poachers within an excepted space, where they 
exist as anonymized criminals, strips them of their citizenship and situates them outside of the 
state’s jurisdiction. As poachers are not seen by the rest of society as fellow citizen but as 
“others” who threaten their lives and the sanctity of the nation, the state is able to use violence 
against them without protestation and emphasize its control. It is through this that the state’s 
biopower becomes inscribed on the modern state and the sovereign right to kill (droit de glaive) 
is created and justified (Foucault 2003).  
Society’s unquestioning acceptance of droit de glaive within conservation reinforces the 
state’s ability to make decisions over the lives and deaths of people more generally. The longer 
the use of violence in conservation goes unchallenged by society, human rights groups, and non-
governmental organizations, the more this tactic becomes adopted. Violence has already become 
a central strategy, apparent in the approach of many nations to migrants and refugees, the control 
of natural resources like oil, timber, and gems, and the treatment of political dissenters. As 
society continues to support the state’s power to kill its own citizens, it is able to maintain a 
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status quo of militarization and violence, resulting in an escalating cycle of violence and human 
rights abuses.  
The intensification of violence in conservation is further problematized when considering 
the role of private conservation entities. In the following section, I analyze how the blurring of 
the state and the private sector has allowed private actors to lay claim to droit de glaive and 
legitimize their power within society and use of violence. I also examine the self-perpetuating 
cycle of the private sector’s claims to biopower and the rise of post-democracy in conservation.    
 
The Blurring of State and Private 
 Contemporary approaches to conservation have blurred the line between the state and the 
private sector. Both in their geographic locations and through their chosen methods, private 
conservancies operate like state-sanctioned protected areas – employing the same technologies, 
enforcing the same laws and regulations, and relying on the same types of militarized 
approaches. Additionally, state and private conservation institutions are engaged in a mutually 
beneficial arrangement – private conservancies can only operate in the manner they do with the 
goodwill and approval of the state and the state derives financial benefit from private 
conservancies that can extend beyond the state’s capacity to further conservation goals. As a 
result, within conservation, the state and the private sector has become increasingly intertwined.  
 This symbiotic relationship between the state and the private sector has allowed private 
actors to gain a larger foothold within conservation. As revealed by the rapid expansion of 
neoliberal conservation, the extension of the private sector into conservation through the 
establishment of private conservancies has resulted in the consolidation of decision making 
power with elite private interests. Private conservation actors and for-profit conservation NGOs 
wield significant power in the contemporary conservation landscape – often receiving more 
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donor funding and international attention than state wildlife agencies as they can accomplish 
conservation goals that the state cannot. Further, as the media content analysis reflected, private 
conservancies are rarely troubled with the same accusations of corruption as state wildlife 
agencies, and so are often the preferred partners for donors. As a result, these private 
conservancies have considerable power in conservation. This consolidation of power 
subsequently contributes to the rise of a post democratic conservation landscape, where power is 
increasingly moved from the state to private elites, resulting in a new form of conservation 
governance that is dominated by the private sector.  
 This emergence of a private elite-controlled governance structure has implications for 
how violence is expressed and understood in conservation as these actors can employ new forms 
and tactics of violence that the state cannot, either due to a lack of resources or institutional 
barriers. Additionally, as private conservancies rely on paramilitary forces for hire, it becomes 
difficult to police how these actors use and misuse violence.  Further, the use of violence by 
private actors is rationalized as legitimate because of the perceived meshing of the state and 
private in the public imaginary. Citizens are often more comfortable with state-sanctioned 
violence due to engrained beliefs about the sovereign’s right to use force, particularly when it is 
framed as for the common good (Leander 2005; Avant 2005; Kinsey 2006). Thus, by blurring 
the distinction between state and private, violence enacted by private actors becomes acceptable 
because it is seen as an extension of the state’s already-accepted droit de glaive.  
It is this legitimization of the private sector’s use of violence through the blurring of state 
and private in conservation that becomes particularly problematic. As distinctions between 
private actors and state actors being increasingly unclear, violence committed by private entities 
can be perceived and rationalized by citizens as extensions of state practices. In this way, 
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violence committed by private actors in the name of conservation is given legitimacy through 
associations with the state’s historic use of force and violence.  
Society’s acceptance of the private sector’s use of violence in conservation then 
reinforces the post-democratic conservation landscape as it allows the private sector to exert 
even more power and control over other citizens. Additionally, through this blending of state and 
private and the consequent rise of post-democracy, the private sector not only extends the state’s 
biopower but actually absorbs it. Thus, biopower is no longer solely in the domain of the state, 
but becomes appropriated into the jurisdiction of the private sector.  
Within this expansion of biopower, private conservation elites are able to lay their own 
claims to droit de glaive through their use of private military forces and unofficial shoot-to-kill 
policies. And, as the public tacitly accepts their deployment of violence, private conservation 
elites continue to emphasize their claims to biopower and droit de glaive, resulting in a self-
fulfilling cycle. With droit de glaive being increasingly invoked by the private sector through the 
expansion of neoliberal conservation, violence itself is undergoing a process of neoliberalization 
– resulting in a paradigm shift in which violence is progressively privatized.   
Through the blurring of the boundary between state and private, conservation has 
increasingly become post-democratic. In so doing, violence has undergone a neoliberal shift, 
where biopower and the sovereign right to kill (droit de glaive) is no longer unique to the state. 
As private actors are allowed to make decisions over the lives and death of others, the post-
democratic conservation space is strengthened.  
 
Conclusion  
This research has interrogated how the media and conservation actors construct the 
identity and context of the poacher to understand how and why violent protected area policies 
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like shoot-to-kill have become acceptable conservation strategies. Through a systematic analysis 
of news articles and first-person interviews with conservation actors, we have demonstrated the 
ways in which poachers are dehumanized and placed in a space of exception to become 
legitimate targets of violence.  
The media content analysis reveals that readers rarely receive identifying information 
about poachers from the media and, when they do, it is either vaguely focused on their ethnicity 
or nationality or it reproduces stereotypes while providing little evidence for these conclusions. 
Additionally, through the assigning of negative characteristics like greed and cruelty and 
associating poachers with terrorism and criminal enterprises, the media constructs poachers as 
criminals. Thus, we see poachers simultaneously de-identified and vilified by the media, 
positioning them within in a space of exception where the use violence is justified. 
In addition to the media analysis, interviews with central conservation actors further 
revealed how poachers come to be situated within an excepted space. Through the processes of 
de-identification, construction of a crisis and enemy, and moral restructuring, poachers are 
actively anonymized, dehumanized, and vilified by those centrally involved in conservation. As 
a result, they become perceived as undeserving of protection by the state, its laws, or by the rest 
of society, exemplifying their status in an excepted space. In this position, the use of violence 
against them, through policies like shoot-to-kill, becomes seen as necessary and morally 
justifiable.  
While this research has revealed important dimensions for understanding how and why 
violent protected area policies have become widely used in conservation, a number of critical 
elements are still in need of exploration. As significant aspects of conservation violence remain 
unexplored and, perhaps more urgently, the level of violence is consciously escalating, this line 
of research requires additional scholarly attention.  
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First, we must actively take steps to uncover who poachers are and why they poach. This 
research highlights society’s lack of knowledge about poachers despite the widespread use and 
acceptance of violence against them, but there still remains uncertainty about who poachers 
actually are. In order to increase transparency around violence in African protected areas and to 
fully understand the effects that violent policies have, it is necessary to know who is actually 
experiencing this violence by increasing efforts to humanize individuals affected by militarized 
protected area policies and giving more power to non-partisan investigations and oversight into 
extra-judicial killings.  
Second, there is a need for greater investigation into the shifting nature of conservation 
violence through a deeper examination of the role that private conservation actors play in using 
and legitimizing violence. We begin to offer an analysis of how the private sector’s intrusion into 
the realm of biopower shapes the violence that is enacted within conservation; however, given 
the rapid expansion of neoliberal conservation, the role of the private sector in environmental 
violence is likely to expand. As such, this is a critical area of future study. 
Finally, Agamben’s spaces of exception can be a useful analytic for investigating other 
examples of environmental violence – including militarized control of other high-value natural 
resources, green gentrification, control of natural resources in contested spaces, or the rise of 
environmental “insurgency” movements –  as it offers a new analytic for understanding how 
violence can be justified by society against particular groups in the name of environmental good.  
This research highlights the lack of knowledge around poachers despite the level of 
violence used and condoned against them. This widespread use and acceptance of violent 
protected area policies like shoot-to-kill reflects how a group of people can come to be 
considered sub-human and legitimate targets of violence, while little effort is expended to 
understand the larger context. Even death row inmates have advocates for their human rights yet 
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we see virtually no attention given to the level of violence used against people in African 
protected areas. 
As the results of this analysis have shown, militarized protected area policies are often 
used with little oversight, against individuals arbitrarily deemed a threat. In many ways, this use 
of violent protected area policies like shoot-to-kill can be seen as a continuation of historic 
coercive conservation tactics as the state’s use of force has been a cornerstone of its approach. 
The violence and human rights implications associated with the state’s coercive conservation 
techniques has long been examined in political ecology (Peluso 1993; LeBillon 2001; Agrawal 
and Redford 2009; Duffy 2014). Yet, as conservation and its related violence is increasingly 
absorbed into the private sector through the expansion of neoliberal conservation and the 
blurring of state and private conservation entities, it raises important concerns about what this 
means for the escalation of violence in conservation. 
Private conservancies, with more donor funding and the ability to charge guests higher 
prices for more exclusive services, often have more resources to police their boundaries and 
protect wildlife. But, greater financial resources to enact violence in protected areas carries the 
risk that conservation’s coercive tactics will continue to escalate with detrimental effects on local 
communities in and around protected areas. And, as the identities of the victims of this violence 
remain hidden from the public, an intensification in the level of violence through new coercive 
tactics and the potential related abuses will likely continue to go unnoticed and unquestioned.  
In addition to the potential for escalating forms of violence, the expansion of 
conservation governance to include the private sector also has implications for how violent 
protected area policies are executed. Due to the challenges of monitoring the exact nature of how 
policies are executed on the ground, it is difficult to ensure that abuses do not occur. Unlike the 
state, the private sector has minimal accountability to citizens. They are not seeking re-election 
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nor are afraid of being overthrown. These private conservancies are only accountable to the state 
and so, as long as they can demonstrate they fulfil the directive of protecting wildlife, there is 
little oversight or disapproval of the tactics they rely on.  
Through the expansion of neoliberal conservation, conservation increasingly resembles a 
post-democracy, where decision-making power collects with elite actors. And, through their 
ability to implement violence against others, private actors are able to gain even greater control 
within society. As more and more power consolidates with elite private actors, societal power 
imbalances and inequalities continue to widen, with elite interests being privileged over others 
against the risk of violent retribution should groups protest. This ability for private citizens to 
implement and physically carry out violence against their peers is a problematic notion that lies 
at the heart of the recent shift towards neoliberal conservation. It is necessary to consider the 
ethical implications of allowing private actors the power to enact violence against others, 
particularly when this violence is difficult to monitor and comprehensive information about its 
use is difficult to come by.  
Given the unique human rights implications of private conservancies’ use of violence and 
the improbability that the spread of neoliberal conservation is likely to abate, it is necessary for 
greater international scrutiny to be paid to how conservation violence is enacted and against 
whom. As not knowing who is on the receiving end of the bullet or the jail sentence makes it 
easier to justify these actions, clarifying the identity of those targeted by violent protected area 
policies is necessary to understand how these polices are used and abused.   
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